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REMARRIAGE AND THE ILLINOIS WRONGFUL DEATH
ACT: THE EFFECT OF CHANGES IN STATUS OF
BENEFICIARIES ON DAMAGES IN
WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS
INTRODUCTION

For years a controversy has been simmering in the law of
damages over remarriage of beneficiaries in wrongful death actions.1 Defendants in such actions have repeatedly sought to
introduce the fact of remarriage into evidence in mitigation of
damages. Thus far, American courts, with one or two notable exceptions,2 have answered these attempts with a resounding "no. ' "
Illinois courts have been no less stubborn than the rest in rebuf4
fing such attempts.
Nevertheless, despite the fact that courts have traditionally
awarded these defendants no more than a collective frown for
their efforts, they keep beating a steady path to the appellate
door. Illinois in particular has seen a flurry of activity in this
area in the past two years, producing at least one significant
procedural adjustment in the law. Defendants in Illinois wrongful death actions are now permitted to disclose the beneficiary's
remarriage to the jury during voir dire examination.5 But this
change offers no substantive advantages to the trial attorney, 6
'See generally 25A C.J.S. Death § 114 (1966); 17 C.J. Death § 226
(1919): 22 AM. JUR. 2d Death § 164 (1965).
2Wisconsin is currently the only American jurisdiction that allows
evidence of remarriage to be offered in mitigation. See Jensen v. Heritage
Mutual Ins. Co., 23 Wis. 2d 344, 127 N.W.2d 228 (1964). Michigan at one
See Stuive v. Pere Marquette Ry., 311 Mich. 143, 18
time allowed it.
Stuive was overruled by Bunda v. Hardwick, 376
N.W.2d 404 (1945).
England allowed even the possibility
Mich. 640, 138 N.W.2d 305 (1965).
of remarriage to be shown in mitigation, Meade v. Clarke Chapman & Co.,
Ltd., [1956], 1 W.L.R. 76 (C.A.), but this rule was abolished by statute.
Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1971 (c.43), § 4(1); construed in Howitt v. Heads, [1972), 2 W.L.R. 183 (Assize). Other members
of the British Commonwealth, such as Canada, still permit introduction of
the changed status into evidence. Lefebvre v. Dowdall & McLean, [1965],
1 Ont. 1 (pecuniary advantage of remarriage had to be proved).
3See Annot., 87 A.L.R.2d 252, 255-56 (1963).
4 Chicago & E.I. Ry. v. Driscoll, 207 Ill. 9, 16, 69 N.E. 620, 623 (1903);
Moore v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 28 Ill. App. 2d 340, 356, 171 N.E.2d 393,
400 (1960) (Action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act); O.S.
Richardson Fueling Co. v. Peters, 82 Ill. App. 508, 512-13 (1899).
5 Mulvey v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 5 Ilf.
App. 3d 1057, 284 N.E.2d 356
(1972), aff'd, 53 Ill. 2d 591, 294 N.E.2d 689 (1973), but see dissenting
opinion, 53 Ill. 2d at 600, 294 N.E.2d at 694; Watson v. Fischbach, 54 Ill. 2d
498, 301 N.E.2d 303 (1973).
6 The change does, however, offer a degree of tactical advantage to the
trial attorney. See discussion in text accompanying note 19 infra.
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and subsequent attempts to introduce the fact of remarriage into
7
the case in chief have failed.
What, then, are the reasons for this perpetual and expensive
parade of defendants advancing an apparently outworn proposition on unsympathetic reviewing courts? There are some practical explanations. One is that the subject of the beneficiary's
remarriage is often included with other substantive contentions
on appeal, 8 thereby lessening the importance of the cost consideration. Another reason is that intuition alone suggests that a
jury which is allowed to take into account the remarriage of the
beneficiary will be much more conservative in awarding damages.
Still another reason is that most states no longer impose a statutory limitation on the amount of damages recoverable in a death
action.9 Illinois provides a good illustration of what happens
when that limitation is removed. After the Illinois legislature
abolished its limitation in 1967,10 the size of awards increased
from the previous maximum of $30,00011 to sums running into
millions of dollars.' 2 The brunt of this increase is born by insurance companies, who have both the financial resources and the
newfound incentive to prosecute the appeals.
But cost factors, intuition, and the woes of insurance companies do not provide sufficiently compelling reasons to induce
courts to reverse their traditional antagonism to the introduction
of the fact of remarriage. A solid legal foundation is needed, and
so far, none satisfactory to the courts has been supplied. In the
past, the chief rationale for its introduction - that the beneficiary's injuries will be partially diminished by the support she
receives from her second husband - has been shut off by the
courts' unswerving adherence to the collateral source rule. This
rule, which prohibits disclosure of payments from third parties
in compensation for a plaintiff's injury, is deadly to any defendant who so much as alludes to the fact that the plaintiff has
already been compensated from some other source.13
If a defense attorney does not want to challenge the sacred
collateral source rule, he must advance some other rationale that
avoids the rule altogether. One such rationale might be found
7E.g.,
Watson v. Fischbach, 54 Ill. 2d 498, 301 N.E.2d 303 (1973);
Hardware State Bank v. Cotner, 55 Ill. 2d 240, 302 N.E.2d 257 (1973).
8 For instance, in Hardware State Bank v. Cotner, 55 Ill. 2d 240, 302
N.E.2d 257 (1973), most of the Supreme Court's opinion was occupied with
issues of negligence.
9 For an account of those states which have recently abolished their
statutory limitations, see Note, 54 Nw. U.L. REv. 254, 255-56 (1959).
10 LAWS OF ILLINOIS OF 1967, vol. II 3227, § 1, amending ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 70, § 2 (1965).
11 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 2 (1957).

12 Demos, Measure of Damages -

Wrongful Death, 60 ILL. B.J. 518

(1972)3 [hereinafter cited as Demos].
" See discussion in text accompanying notes 107-16 infra.
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in an examination of the nature of damages in a death action and
the predictive function of the jury. Part of a jury's task in fixing
damages in a death action is to predict the extent and duration
of benefits the deceased would have provided for the beneficiary
had he lived.1 4 Some of these benefits spring from the beneficiary's right to support from the decedent 1' - a right which
is cut off by the decedent's death. When the beneficiary remarries
before the trial, it seems somehow incongruous to allow the jury
to make its prediction without considering the fact that the
beneficiary has reacquired that right.
DISCLOSURE OF REMARRIAGE ON

VOIR DIRE

EXAMINATION

The extent and pervasiveness of this incongruity can he
illustrated by the recent rash of Illinois cases dealing with disclosure of remarriage during voir dire examination. In Mulvey
v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 18 the defendant succeeded in slipping the disclosure of remarriage into the proceedings during
voir dire, 7 on the rationale that "[i]t would be offensive to the
integrity of the judicial process if the plaintiff, after taking an
oath to be truthful, were permitted to misrepresent her marital
status to the jury."' 8 Success breeds its own following. The
Mulvey opinion was hardly off the press when the defense counsel in Watson v. Fischbach' not only utilized this new advantage,
but tried to improve upon it. Just to make sure that the jury did
not forget that the widow had remarried, the subject was
brought up again during defense counsel's cross-examination of
the widow. 2 0 This home-grown extension of Mulvey was squashed
by the Illinois Supreme Court, which was unwilling to sanction
21
any reference to remarriage other than during voir dire.
Watson by no means ended the matter.

On its heels came

14I.P.I.2d 31.04. Court opinions in general have tended to combine
consideration of a decedent's earning potential with the beneficiary's expectancy of future contributions. For purposes of discussing the status of
beneficiaries, they will be treated separately.
15See discussion of the significance of the right to support in death
actions in the text accompanying notes 119-28 infra.
16 5 Il. App. 3d 1057, 284 N.E.2d 356 (1972), aff'd, 53 Il. 2d 591,
294 N.E.2d 689 (1973).
17 Id.
at 1060-61, 284 N.E.2d at 358.
IsDubil v. Labate, 52 N.J. 255, 261, 245 A.2d 177, 180 (1968); quoted
in Mulvey v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 5 Ill. App. 3d 1057, 1061, 284 N.E.2d 356, 358
(1972), and Watson v. Fischbach, 54 Ill. 2d 498, 501, 301 N.E.2d 303, 305
(1973).
19 54 Ill. 2d 498, 301 N.E.2d 303 (1973).
Watson involved an action
under the Illinois Dram Shop Act, but the applicable principles regarding
remarriage and voir dire are the same.
20 Id. at 499, 301 N.E.2d at 304.
21 Id. at 503-04, 301 N.E.2d at 306, where the court stated:
[The] cross examination . . . clearly exceeded the scope of the direct
examination. Its purpose was to and it did emphasize plaintiff's remarriage. . . . The questions and resulting answers were clearly irrelevant under earlier decisions. ...
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Hardware State Bank v. Cotner.2 2 In Hardware, the decedent
was killed in a farming accident, leaving behind a widow and an
infant son. The decedent's administrator brought a wrongful
death action against the farm owner, with the widow and son
designated as beneficiaries of the action. By the time the case
went to trial, the widow had remarried and the son had been
adopted by none other than the defendant himself. 23 It takes
little imagination to realize the lethal effect that disclosure of
adoption in these circumstances could have upon the size of the
jury's verdict. Not surprisingly, the question of disclosure of
adoption found its way into the Illinois Supreme Court's opinion.
The court conceded that in some cases the disclosure of the information might be necessary during voir dire:
The reason for disclosure of remarriage during voir dire was to
alleviate false testimony by the surviving spouse concerning marital
status. The same result
is appropriate to adoption of the deceased's
24
surviving children.

But not in this case:
The trial court need not disclose information concerning adoption
where, as here, there exists the greater probability that nondis25
closure may be accomplished without false testimony.

One interpretation of this statement is that, if the beneficiary is capable of lying to the jury about his change of status,
that change should be disclosed to the jury; but if he is not
capable of lying to the jury, the disclosure should be prohibited.
This rather crude summation of the court's position merely illustrates that it has not retreated one iota from its theoretical
opposition to the introduction of evidence of remarriage or adoption into the case in chief. The court's position is a tacit admission that the court, like the defense counsel in Watson, views any
disclosure of such a change in status as having a potentially
marked influence upon the jury's award.
This feeling is shared with other jurisdictions, where there
is a split of opinion as to the desirability of disclosure of remarriage on voir dire. 26 In Wiesel v. Cicerone,27 the Rhode Island
22

55 Ill. 2d 240, 302 N.E.2d 257 (1973).

Id. at 248, 302 N.E.2d at 260.
Id. at 249, 302 N.E.2d at 263.
25 Id.
26 The cases in which disclosure of remarriage on voir dire was allowed
are: Watson v. Fischbach, 54 Ill. 2d 498, 301 N.E.2d 303 (1973) ; Mulvey v.
Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 5 Ill. App. 3d 1057, 284 N.E.2d 356 (1972), aff'd, 53
Ill. 2d 591, 294 N.E.2d 689 (1973); Thompson v. Peters, 386 Mich. 532,
194 N.W.2d 301 (1972); and Dubil v. Labate, 52 N.J. 255, 245 A.2d 177
(1968).
Cases holding contra include: Wiesel v. Cicerone, 106 R.I. 595, 261 A.2d
889 (1970) ; Rodak v. Fury, 31 App. Div. 2d 816, 298 N.Y.S.2d 50 (1969) ;
Cherrigan v. City and County of San Francisco, 262 Cal. App. 2d 643, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 42 (1968) ; Helmick v. Netzley, 12 Ohio Misc. 97, 229 N.E.2d 476
(1967).
27 106 R.I. 595, 261 A.2d 889 (1970).
23

24
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Supreme Court shied away from allowing any disclosure of remarriage. 28 So zealous was the Wiesel court in keeping the fact
of remarriage from the jury, that it expressly prohibited the
2
beneficiary from being sworn in under her new name at trial. 9
It appears that courts considering the voir dire problem
have been confronted with the choice of either fostering an illusion in the interest of keeping their substantive theoretical
position intact, or fostering the truth in the interest of maintaining the procedural integrity of the trial. This choice presents
the court with a dilemma. On the one hand, if the surviving
spouse is allowed to lie on the stand about her subsequent change
in identity, there is no danger that a jury will be prejudiced by
disclosure of remarriage, but the court comes dangerously close
to sanctioning perjury. On the other hand, if the surviving
spouse is forced to testify truthfully as to any subsequent change
in identity, the court's theoretical position that remarriage of
the beneficiary has no effect upon the damages recoverable
might well be rendered moot by the jury. Some courts, such as
the Rhode Island court, have chosen the first alternative. Others,
such as the Illinois courts, have chosen the second. Those that
have chosen the second apparently believe that a judge's stern
admonition to the jury not to consider the change of status in
assessing damages will be sufficient;2 ° but the Illinois Supreme
Court's handling of the adoption question hardly indicates that
the courts are secure in that belief. On the contrary, both Wiesel
and Hardware State Bank betray an apprehension that a jury
will include a consideration of the beneficiary's change of status,
admonition or no admonition. The only conflict between these
decisions is over where to draw the line and prohibit disclosure.
HARDWARE STATE BANK AND THE VAN BEECK RULE
Hardware State Bank is an important decision, not only
because it dealt with the remarriage and adoption problems for
purposes of voir dire examination, but also because it introduced
a new rationale for disclosure of these changes of status in the
case in chief. In Hardware the defendant advanced a rather
28

To inject information concerning a widow's remarriage would,

in our judgment, not only introduce irrelevant matter, but what is more

important, it would be admitting evidence which could very well have a

tendency to confuse the jury and adversely prejudice the plaintiff. This

would in our opinion be putting a premium on form and overlooking
substance.
607, 261 A.2d at 895.
Id. at
29
1d.
In
Dubil v. Labate, 52 N.J. 255, 262, 245 A.2d 177, 181, the New
30
Jersey Supreme Court stated: "[W]e have no doubt that the jury, after
proper instructions by the court, will be capable of returning a verdict
uninfluenced by the plaintiff's remarriage."
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attractive argument attacking the constitutionality of the exclusion of evidence of these changes.
His argument developed in this manner: There is a line of
cases holding that where a right of action for wrongful death
has accrued to a beneficiary, and the beneficiary dies before the
action is prosecuted, the action does not abate31 as it did at common law. 3 2 Instead, it survives for the use of the beneficiary's
estate, but with one important qualification: the estate may collect damages only for the time the beneficiary was living after
the decedent's death.33 This rule was crystallized by Justice
Cardozo in Van Beeck v. Sabine Towing Co.,3 4 and was only
recently adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court in McDaniel v.
Bullard.3 5 In Hardware the defendant used the rule to form the
basis of his constitutional assault upon the remarriage problem.
Defendant's argument was actually a three-stage effort involving two assertions and a conclusion. The assertions were (1)
that under the Van Beeck rule the death of the beneficiary is
actually a change of status that reduces the amount of damages
recoverable, and (2) that adoption and remarriage are also
changes of status strongly analogous to the death of the beneficiary.3 8
The conclusion was that to allow a jury to consider
the one change of status (death) in mitigation, but not to consider the others (remarriage and adoption), "is arbitrary and
violative of due process and equal protection. '87 The Court disposed of this argument in five sentences:
Specifically, we find no equal-protection violation in refusing to
admit evidence of remarriage and adoption in mitigation of damages in a wrongful death action. There exists no invidious discrimination between this evidence and that of the death of the
beneficiary because there is a reasonable basis for differentiation.
It has been recognized that to allow evidence of remarriage would
permit the introduction of matters of a highly speculative nature.
.. .This same rationale is applicable to adoption. However, we
believe that evidence of the death of the beneficiary does not pose
this problem.3
The defendant set up a general analogy between the effect of
death upon damages and the effect of remarriage or adoption.
Unfortunately, a general analogy can often fall prey to distinctions, and the court had no trouble finding one here. It chose the
3' See Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 1291 (1955).
83

Hall v. Gillins, 13 Ill.
2d 26, 28, 147 N.E.2d 352, 354 (1958).

33 See Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 1291 (1955).
34 300 U.S. 342
(1937).
3534 Ill.
2d 487, 216 N.E.2d 140 (1966).
31Hardware State Bank v. Cotner, 55 Ill.
2d 240, 248, 302 N.E.2d 257,
262 (1973).
37 Id. at 248, 302 N.E.2d at 263.
38 Id. at 249, 302 N.E.2d at 263.
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distinction quoted above, which intimated that the defendant's
constitutional argument breaks down because the effect of the
beneficiary's death on damages is readily ascertainable, while the
effect of remarriage or adoption is not.
But does the defendant's argument and the court's answer
properly address the problem presented by the Van Beeck rule?
The defendant's contention was only that the effect of death as a
change of status was to place that fact before the jury to consider in mitigation of damages. In reality, the effect of the beneficiary's death is to limit the jury's inquiry to the monetary
benefits that had already accumulated before that death. The
point is not that damages are mitigated; the point is simply that
after the occurrence of the beneficiary's death they do not accrue
at all.39
The defendant could have claimed that remarriage or adoption also has the effect of limiting the jury's inquiry to benefits accruing before remarriage. That contention would have rendered the court's distinction untenable, as the effect of each
change of status would be equally ascertainable. Now it is obvious that the defendant could not have maintained that death as a
change of status is identical in effect to remarriage or adoption
in all respects, for in the first instance the beneficiary no longer
exists and cannot receive compensation, while in the others she
still does and can. However, he could have maintained that all
three changes of status would have cut off the beneficiary's right
to support from the breadwinner (had he remained alive), and
that to this extent the changes of status are identical. An approach such as this would require a reappraisal of both the nature of damages in wrongful death actions and the present reasons for exclusion of remarriage from evidence.
IN BRIEF: DAMAGES UNDER THE

The Illinois Wrongful Death Act

40

ACT

creates a distinct cause of

39 McDaniel v. Bullard, 34 Ill. 2d 487, 493, 216 N.E.2d 140, 144 (1966).
40 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 70, §§ 1, 2 (1973).
The Illinois Wrongful Death Act is one of the many offspring of Lord
Campbell's Act, 9 & 10 VICT. c.93 (1846). See MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF DAMAGES, § 95 (1935). Lord Campbell's Act was a response
to various criticisms of the old common law rule that a personal injury
action abated with the death of the person injured. See Van Beeck v.
Sabine Towing Co., 300 U.S. 342, 344 (1937) ; Hall v. Gillins, 13 Ill. 2d 26
28, 147 N.E.2d 352, 354 (1958).
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action 41 that vests, upon the decedent's wrongful 42 death, in his

personal representative. The personal representative has only a
nominal interest in the action, 43 as "the amount recovered in
every such action shall be for the exclusive benefit of the widow
and next of kin of such deceased person. . . . -44 Thus, the real
parties in interest are the beneficiaries, to whom damages are
5
awarded.
It is important to keep in mind that the Act is not a survival
statute.4 While the right of action flows from the defendant's
wrongful act, 47 it is not the same right of action that the decedent
had while he lived. It is the beneficiary's injuries 48 - not the
decedent's49 - that the statute attempts to compensate.
Accordingly, a measure of compensation consistent with the
beneficiary's injuries must be employed. 50 To ascertain the damages a jury must predict not only the value of the decedent's life,
but the share of that value which the beneficiary could expect
41 Maney v. Chicago, B.&Q.R.R., 49 Ill.
App. 105, 114 (1892). This is
the prevailing view in American jurisdictions. See cases cited in 22 AM.

JuR. 2d Death § 13, nn.14&17 (1965).

But cf.

IOWA CODE ANN.

§ 611.20

(1950), which is, in essence, a survival statute. See also Floyd v. Fruit
Industries, 144 Conn. 659, 136 A.2d 918 (1957), and cases cited in 22 AM.
See also Annot., 163 A.L.R. 253-54,
JuR. 2d Death § 13, n.20 (1965).
where the author stated:
[Ilt is not always clear whether the statute under which a particular
action is brought is a 'survival statute' or a 'wrongful death statute.'
Some statutes which are designated as 'death statutes' by the courts
appear to possess some of the familiar features of 'survival statutes,'
that is to say, the damages which they provide may be recovered are
damages to the estate of the deceased, as distinguished from some particular relative or relatives, or are damages for the pain and suffering
of the deceased.
42 No right of action exists if the defendant's act was not in some way
wrongful. The Illinois act provides that the right of action arises when
"... the act, neglect, or default is such as would, if death had not ensued,
have entitled the party injured to maintain an action .. " ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 70, § 1 (1973).
43 McDavid v. Fiscar, 342 Ill. App. 673, 678, 97 N.E.2d 587, 589 (1951).
44 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, §§ 1, 2 (1973).
45 Wright v. Royse, 43 Ill. App. 2d 267, 193 N.E.2d 340 (1963).
This
46 Knierim v. Izzo, 22 Ill. 2d 73, 82, 174 N.E.2d 157, 162 (1961).
is the prevailing view where Lord Campbell-type death acts are in force
(note 41 supra). This view is also the reason that under the Illinois act
the award cannot be reached by creditors of the decedent. Wright v. Royse,
43 Ill. App. 2d 267, 193 N.E.2d 340 (1963).
47 Clarke v. Storchak, 384 Ill. 564, 52 N.E.2d 229, 234 (1943), appeal
dismissed, 322 U.S. 713 (1944). See cases cited in 22 AM. JUR. 2d Death
§ 18, n. 3, and § 22, n. 9.
48 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 2 (1973).
49 In Ohnesorge v. Chicago City R.R., 259 Ill. 424, 430, 102 N.E. 819,
821 (1913), the court stated:
The cause of action brought by the personal representative was not
intended to permit the widow and next of kin to recover for the pain
and suffering of the deceased or for medical attendance and other expenses incurred in and about being healed of the injury. It was not designed by the Legislature to give damages for any injury received by
the deceased. ..
50 See 16 I.L.P. Death § 55 (1971); 22 AM. JUR. 2d Death §§ 115-78
(1965).
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from him.5 1 This presents two thorny problems: First, the
common law was traditionally reluctant to value the life of a
human being, 52 and it is the loss of life that gives rise to a beneficiary's injuries." ,Hence under a non-punitive wrongful death
act 54 a jury must try to predict the value of that which was once
regarded as totally unsusceptible of valuation. 5 Second, the
statute provides that the jury should award only "fair and just
compensation with reference to the pecuniary injuries resulting
from such death .. .'" It makes no attempt to compensate the
beneficiary's non-monetary injuries, such as mental anguish or
bereavement. 8" However, a sympathetic jury shepherded by a
good plaintiff's lawyer might well be influenced by such factors,
the statute and the judge's admonitions to the contrary 8 notwithstanding. 9 Hence, the jury could err to the advantage of
the beneficiary by overvaluing the decedent's life, or by overvaluing the beneficiary's true monetary interest in that life.
The original statute minimized this risk by imposing a limitation on the amount of recoverable damages.6" While the limitation was in force, courts could console themselves with the
knowledge that if there were an error in the beneficiary's favor,
at least that error could never exceed the upper boundary imposed
51 I.P.I.2d 31.04.

Court opinions in general have exhibited a tendency

to combine considerations of the decedent's earning potential with the beneficiary's expectancy of future contributions. For purposes of discussing the
status of beneficiaries, they will be treated separately.
52 In Coliseum Motor Co. v. Hester, 43 Wyo. 298, 304-05, 3 P.2d 105,
106 (1931), the court stated:
[Wlhen Lord Ellenborough in 1808, in the case of Baker v.Bolton, 1
Campbell, 493, announced that 'in a civil court the death of a human
being cannot be complained of as an injury,' he was fundamentally
right. The public conscience had simply not yet awakened to the fact
that life as such has a pecuniary value. The age of chivalry with its
continuous combats and the system of duels doubtless contributed to this
fact. And the cheapness of human life is no less indicated by the multitude of capital offenses, and the scaffolds erected as a punishment for
many crimes, which we, in this age of enlightenment, would consider
minor in character.

53It is necessary to distinguish between the wrongdoer's act, from
which the liability arises, and the death of the decedent, from which the
damages arise. See Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59, 70 (1913).
54 Punitive damages are not allowed in wrongful death actions in states
such as Illinois, where damages are assessed in accordance with the beneficiary's pecuniary injuries. Conant v. Griffin, 48 Ill. 410 (1868).
However, in those states having wrongful death acts which merely provide for
the survival of the decedent's cause of action, as opposed to the creation of a
new right of action for the beneficiary, punitive damages may be awarded.
22 AM. JUR. 2d Death §§ 136-39 (1965).
55 Cf. note 52 supra.
56 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 2 (1973)
(emphasis added).
5 Zostautas v. St. Anthony De Padua Hospital, 23 Ill. 2d 326, 336-37,
178 N.E.2d 303, 308 (1961).
58 I.P.I.2d 31.07.
59 See Kissel, Sympathy in Wrongful Death Litigation, 58 ILL. B.J. 442
(1970).
60 LAws OF ILLINOIS OF 1853, 97, § 2 (limit of $5,000).
The limit was
raised several times. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 3, Historical Note
(Smith-Hurd 1959).
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by the statute. But aside from the limitation, it fell to the courts
to develop standards for measuring the beneficiary's "pecuniary

injuries."

Now that the Illinois legislature has abolished the

limitation,"' it is solely the employment of. these court-created
standards that produces the measure of damages in a death

action.

62

The first set of standards deals with the unmeasurable: the

monetary value of the decedent's life. No beneficiary suing under
a non-punitive wrongful death statute" may recover more than
an amount representing the present value

could have

earned 65

4

of what the decedent

or contributed as services. 6

To the extent

that a recovery exceeds that amount, that recovery does not reflect pecuniary injuries, and is punitive.6 7 The value of the decedent's life, then, represents the upper lirfiit beyond which damages are not recoverable.6 8
Since a jury must determine the present value of the decedent's future earnings and services, each wrongful death action
involves a series of predictions relevant to that value and based
on presently known facts about the decedent. For instance,
when the parties disagree over how long the decedent would have
lived,6' 9 they may introduce mortality tables70 and evidence of his

state of health as it existed prior to death7'1 in order to enhance
their contentions.

Likewise, a jury may predict what the de§ 1, amending ILL. REV. STAT.

LAWS OF ILLINOIS OF 1967, vol. II 3227,
ch. 70, § 2 (1965).
61

62 It should be remembered, however, that at no time did Illinois statutory law allow the jury to be informed of the limitation on damages. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 2 (1973). Hence, the jury could return a verdict considerably higher than the statutory limit. It should also be remembered
that Illinois courts have kept the power of remittitur available in wrongful
death awards. Freer v. Rowden, 108 Ill. App. 2d 335, 247 N.E.2d 635
(1969).

63 See note 54 supra.

64 I.P.I.2d 31.04. See Demos, supra note 12.
65See note 51 supra.
66 Eggimann v. Wise, 56 Ill. App. 2d 385, 389-90, 206 N.E.2d 472, 475

(1964). Loss of a parent's instruction and training is also compensable
under the Act. See Slone v. Morton, 39 Ill. App. 2d 495, 188 N.E.2d 493
(1963).
6(7However, the recovery is not necessarily punitive in the sense that it
represents a public policy of penalizing the wrongdoer. It is punitive only
in that it exceeds the amount that the decedent could possibly have contributed to the beneficiaries. The foregoing situation is rare. If a jury
becomes overgenerous, the court still has the power of remittitur. See note
62 supra.
68 There is a possible exception to this postulate: the presumption of
loss in favor of a widow or lineal next of kin. See text accompanying notes
81-84 infra. Theoretically a jury could award substantial damages because
of the beneficiary's relationship to the decedent, even though, due to the
decedent's age at death, the value of his life was less than the award.
See Note, 54 Nw. U.L. REv. 254, 258-59 (1959).
69 Swift Co. v. Gaylord, 229 Ill. 330, 337-38, 82 N.E. 299, 302 (1907).
70 Allendorf v. Elgin J.&E Ry., 8 Ill. 2d 164, 133 N.E.2d 288, cert.

352 U.S. 833 ( 5 ).
denied,
,1 I.P.I.2d 31.04. 1 9 6
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cedent's future income would have been,72 based upon his past
record of earnings,7 3 his work habits,74 and his physical and mental potential.75 To determine the monetary value of any future
loss of services the jury may consider the nature and extent of
personal services rendered to the beneficiary in the past.7 6 These
standards present problems no more serious than those encountered in determining prospective damages in any personal injury

action.

77

While the first set of standards concerns the pecuniary
value of the decedent's life, the second concerns the pecuniary

interest that a beneficiary has in that life.78 That interest varies
according to
ute provides
and next of
"lineal" and

the class into which the beneficiary falls. The statfor two classes of beneficiaries: surviving spouses
kin.79 Illinois case law subdivides the latter into
"collateral" next of kin.80

This subdivision is important. Widows, widowers,"" and
lineal next of kin (i.e., direct descendants and immediate ancestors of the decedent) 8 2 are presumed to have suffered pecuniary
injuries from the mere fact of death.8 3 So far as securing a jury
72 See note 51 supra.

73I.P.I.2d 31.04; See Demos, supra note 12, at 520.
74 I.P.I.2d 31.04.
7 Paul v. Garman, 310 Ill. App. 447, 463, 34 N.E.2d 884, 891 (1941)
(decedent was "strong and healthy")
76 Pennell v. Baltimore & O.R.R., "13 Ill. App. 2d 433, 439, 142 N.E.2d
497, 501 (1957) (handiness of deceased around the home).
77 For a discussion of damages for impairment of future earning capacity in personal injury actions, see MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW
OF DAMAGES § 86 (1935).
78 See note 51 supra.
79 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 2 (1973).
80 This subdivision appears to have originated in Chicago & A.R.R.
v. Shannon, 43 Ill. 338, 346 (1867).
81 The surviving husband may recover damages for his wife's wrongful
death. In re Estate of Dillman, 8 Ill. App. 2d 239, 131 N.E.2d 634 (1956).
82 The rules of descent and distribution, found in ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3,
§ 11 (1973), are followed when determining next of kin. Wilcox v. Bierd,
330 Ill. 571, 581-82, 162 N.E. 170, 175 (1924), overruled on other grounds
in McDaniel v. Bullard, 34 Ill. 2d 487, 216 N.E.2d 140 (1966).
83 This rule is not well-considered. It was first fully enunciated in City
of Chicago v. Scholten 75 Ill. 468, 471 (1874), where a twelve-year-old child
had been killed, and his parents could offer no proof as to the pecuniary
value of his life. The court cited City of Chicago v. Major, 18 Ill. 349, 360
(1857), which merely held that a jury must consider the extent of the
pecuniary loss suffered by the parents. The Scholten case was followed by
Chicago & A.R.R. v. Shannon, 43 Ill. 338 (1867), which introduced the
distinction between lineal and collateral next of kin, but did not voice any
presumption of substantial loss. The presumption was inadvertently extended to the surviving spouse by dicta in Howlett v. Doglio, 402 Ill. 311,
316, 83 N.E.2d 708, 712 (1949), even though the widow had been required
to show pecuniary injuries to recover more than nominal damages in Goen
v. Baltimore & O.S.W.R.R., 179 Ill. App. 566, 570 (1913). The scope of
the presumption was limited in Barrow v. Lence, 17 Ill. App. 2d 527, 151
N.E.2d 120 (1958) (daughter was an adult), and in Rust v. Holland, 15 Ill.
App. 2d 369, 146 N.E.2d 82, annotated in 67 A.L.R.2d 739 (1957) (decedent's minor children who had been adopted by a foster parent before
decedent's death were denied recovery).
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verdict is concerned, this advantage may well be illusory, as juries
may hesitate to award substantial damages without some proof
of loss.14 But at least the presumption will carry the case to a
jury if the other elements of the cause of action are shown.
When no lineal kindred are alive at the decedent's death, the action may be brought for the use of the collateral next of kin
having the nearest degree of blood relationship to the decedent.8 5
A collateral next of kin, however, has no presumption of loss
running in his favor, and must prove that he could expect to
receive substantial support from the decedent, otherwise he is
entitled to only nominal damages.,6
Aside from the operation of the presumption, the standards
applied to the beneficiary's interest in a decedent's life are also
based upon predictions. These predictions concern what the
beneficiary could reasonably expect, in monetary terms, from the
decedent had he lived.17 Again, many present facts may be admitted to show the extent of this expectancy. For instance, did
the decedent have a generous nature,8 or did he confer specific
benefits upon the widow or next of kin in the past? 9 A minor
child cannot expect to receive the same amount of support or
other pecuniary assistance upon attaining his majority; nor can
a wife expect her spouse to shower benefits upon her estate after
she dies. Hence the ages of beneficiaries are relevant in assessing damages. 90
CHANGES OF STATUS AND THE VAN BEECK RULE

Any consideration of a beneficiary's expectancy must sooner
or later involve a contemplation of a beneficiary's status, for this
expectancy must, to a large extent, be governed by the relation
to the decedent. This relation is partially expressed by the class
into which the beneficiary falls: widow(er), lineal next of kin,
or collateral next of kin. It is obvious that this relation is subject
to change while the decedent is still living. The spouse could get
divorced, the child could be adopted, or the worthless brother
could become self-supporting. Moreover, any of these persons
could die, thereby terminating the relation. Courts have generally been willing to predict a change in the relation, and a corresponding change in pecuniary injuries, if the change were
See Demos supra note 12, at 521.
ILL. REV. §TAT. ch. 3, § 11 (1973).
s6
Rost v. Noble & Co., 316 Ill. 357, 375, 147 N.E. 258, 265 (1925).
8
7 See note 51 supra. See also cases cited in 22 AM. JUR. 2d Death
§ 119,
nn. 1 & 2 (1965).
88
See 22 AM. JUR. 2d Death § 168 (1965).
89 Kulvie v. Bunsen Coal Co., 253 Ill. 386, 392, 97 N.E. 688, 691 (1912).
90 Swift Co. v. Gaylord, 229 Ill. 330, 337-38, 82 N.E. 299, 302 (1907).
See The City of Rome, 48 F.2d 333, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1930), as to the possibility of damages being limited to those accruing during a next of kin's
minority.
84
86
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anticipated by the beneficiary before the decedent's death. Thus,
an interlocutory divorce decree 91 or an attempt to obtain a divorce 92 have been held relevant on the issue of damages, because
such a contemplated change in a beneficiary's status would arguably change the beneficiary's expectancy.
Such a contemplated change of status, however, occurs
within the marriage relation and influences the extent of monetary benefits that may be expected to flow from the relation.
What happens when a change occurs outside a relation that has
been terminated already? Until recently, the rule has been that
all such changes were irrelevant and inadmissible in death actions in Illinois."' McDaniel v. Bullard'"altered that doctrine and
instituted the Van Beeck rule, and the consequences of that adjustment have not yet been fully appreciated.
In McDaniel, the decedent's infant daughter was the sole
surviving next of kin, having lived through an automobile accident that claimed the lives of her sister and parents. The decedent's estate commenced a wrongful death action, but before
trial the infant died of causes unrelated to the accident. The
trial court held that the action abated. In reversing this ruling,
the Illinois Supreme Court borrowed heavily from Justice Cardozo's opinion in Van Beeck v. Sabine Towing Co. :"-'
The general rule was said to be that 'executors and administrators are the representatives of the temporal property, that is, the
debts and goods of the deceased, but not of their wrongs, except
where those wrongs operate to the temporal injury of their personal
estate.' When we remember that under the death statutes an
independent cause of action is created in favor of the beneficiaries
for their pecuniary damages, the conclusion is not difficult that the
cause of action once accrued is not divested or extinguished by the
death of one or more of the beneficiaries thereafter, but survives,
like a cause of action for injury to a property right or interest, to
the extent that the estate of the deceased beneficiary has been
impaired. To that extent, if no farther, a new property right or
91 Chapman v. Gulf, M.&O.R.R., 337 Ill. App.
556 (1949).
92 This proposition is tenuous. In Chapman
Ill. App. 611, 619-20, 86 N.E.2d 552, 556 (1949),
v. Pete-Erickson Co., 186 Minn. 583, 244 N.W. 68,

611, 620, 86 N.E.2d 552,
v. Gulf, M.&O.R.R., 337
the court cited Peterson
69 (1932), to this effect,

but no case on point has arisen in Illinois. As to whether and how the
personal relations of the spouses affect damages in a wrongful death ac-

tion, see Annot., 19 A.L.R. 1409 (1922), and Annot., 90 A.L.R. 920 (1934).
92 Wilcox v. Bierd, 330 Ill. 571, 162 N.E. 170 (1928), overruled in
McDaniel v. Bullard, 34 Ill. 2d 487, 216 N.E.2d 140 (1966); O.S. Richardson Fueling Co. v. Peters, 82 11. App. 508 (1898) (remarriage of widow).
Adoption as a change of status did not arise until Rust v. Holland, 15 Ill.
App. 2d 369, 146 N.E.2d 82, annotated in 67 A.L.R.2d 739 (1957), and there
the children were adopted before the decedent's death. No case dealing with
adoption after the decedent's death arose until Hardware State Bank.
94 34 Ill.
2d 487, 216 N.E.2d 140 (1966).
95300 U.S. 342 (1937).
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interest, or one analogous thereto, has been brought into being
through legislative action."
If the decedent's death is considered an injury to property
from the standpoint of the beneficiary's estate, is it considered an
injury to property from the standpoint of the beneficiary himself ?
Probably not, for if at the decedent's death the "property interest" were considered a totally vested interest in the value of
the decedent's entire projected life span, that interest should
logically pass in full to the beneficiary's estate. In reality, the
injury is one merely "analogous" to injury to a property right.
This analogy does nothing more than provide Justice Cardozo
hat while adjusting
with a peg on which to hang his intellectual
97
an inequitable facet of the common law.
The important feature of the Van Beeck rule is that the decedent's death had already terminated the relation between beneficiary and decedent before the beneficiary died. By allowing the
action to survive while limiting damages to those accruing before
the beneficiary's death, the rule sets up the death of the beneficiary before trial as a secondary event (the death of the decedent being the primary event) to which the jury looks in assessing damages. Van Beeck and McDaniel in effect constitute a
breach of the traditional rule that events occurring between a
decedent's death and trial are irrelevant to the assessment of
damages.
The remaining question is the significance of the breach of
tradition perpetrated by the Van Beeck rule. Can or should this
breach logically be extended to cover the remarriage or adoption of beneficiaries? The defendant in Hardware State Bank
tried unsuccessfully to secure this extension, 8 but it was his approach to the problem, and not necessarily the merits of the rule,
that caused his failure. An examination of the courts' reasons
for the exclusion of remarriage from evidence shows that the rule
strikes at the foundation of one of these reasons and requires
reappraisal of the nature of damages in wrongful death actions.
DISCLOSURE OF REMARRIAGE AND THE VAN BEECK RULE

The courts have employed three basic rationales to support
their refusal to allow disclosure of a beneficiary's remarriage
16 Id. at 348-49.
"1 Allowing the death action to abate is inequitable for this reason:
Assume that H is wrongfully killed and W is left to fend for herself. Later,
after filing a wrongful death action, she dies before the case goes to trial.
During the time she was alive she had to make up for the loss of her husband's earnings out of her own pocket. This diminishes the size of her
estate when she dies. If the action abates, the estate has no way of recovering the value of that depletion, which would have been possible had
she recovered a judgment before her death.
98
See text accompanying note 36 supra.
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into evidence. The first goes to the prospective nature of recoveries under the Wrongful Death Act. The argument here is that
damages are determined as of the time of decedent's death, and
are predicated upon what benefits the spouse could at that time
have expected from him had he lived; hence, after the decedent's
death, events changing the beneficiary's status are immaterial."
The second rationale, often espoused in conjunction with the
first, goes to a well-entrenched judicial policy that the wrongdoer
should not be exonerated by benefits received by the victim as
compensation from a third party.10 0 This is actually an expression of the so-called "collateral source rule." 10 1 The third,
which was employed in Hardware State Bank,10 2 is that disclosure
of remarriage forces a court to engage in undue speculation
centered on a comparison of the new spouse with the old; hence
for policy reasons such disclosure should be prohibited.1 0 3 All
three theories are interrelated, and all three have weaknesses.
The first rationale is the one called into question by the Van
Beeck rule. One of the fundamental tenets of case law relating
to wrongful death actions is that damages are assessed by view04
ing the situation from one vantage point: the decedent's death.'
Since the beneficiary's right of action arises with the decedent's
death, and since the injury is compensated only according to the
loss of those pecuniary benefits that can reasonably be expected,
it would seem logical to pick death as the point at which this expectancy is measured.
But when does the expectancy materialize? If the decedent
had lived, the beneficiary's expectancy would have materialized
day by day, and might have been cut off or reduced in any of
three ways: (1) by events affecting the decedent's power to give,
(2) by events affecting his duty to give, and (3) by events affecting his inclination to give. It is obvious that death terminates the decedent's power, duty, and inclination, and thereby
produces the injury to the beneficiary. It is just as obvious that
if only decedent's power is reduced, he, and not the beneficiary,
99E.g., Gulf, C.&S.F. Ry. v. Younger, 90 Tex. 387, 391, 38 S.W. 1121,
1122 (1897); St. Louis, I.M.&S. Ry. v. Maddry, 57 Ark. 306, 310-11, 21
S.W. 472, 473 (1893).
100 McFarland v. Illinois C.R.R., 241 La. 15, 19, 127 So. 2d 183, 186,
87 A.L.R.2d 246 (1961). It is notable that the reasoning of the McFarland

case is actually a combination of the first two rationales.
101 Harding v. Town of Townshend, 43 Vt. 536 (1871), is the first case
in which the term "collateral source" is used. See Maxwell, The Collateral
Source Rule in the American Law of Damages, 46 MINN. L. REv. 669 (1962)
and Averbach, The Collateral Source Rule, 21 OHI0 ST. L.J. 231 (1960),
for discussions of the origins of the rule.
102 55 Ill.
2d 240, 249, 302 N.E.2d 257, 263 (1973), citing Smith v.
Wells, 258 S.C. 316, 188 S.E.2d 470 (1972).

103 Smith v. Wells, 258 S.C. 316, 188 S.E.2d 470 (1972); The City
of Rome, 48 F.2d 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1930).
104 See note 101 supra.
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gains the right of action. If, on the other hand, only his duty
or inclination is reduced, then the beneficiary's expectancy is
also reduced, and that reduction should be reflected in a smaller
award. This is the reason for concluding that courts are correct
in allowing an inquiry into changes of status that were already
contemplated at the decedent's death, such as a pending or threatened divorce.,,, It is also the reason that the Van Beeck and
McDaniel decisions are sound from the standpoint of logic as
well as policy. 106 The death of the beneficiary would probably
terminate the decedent's duty and inclination to give, if he were
still alive.
The Van Beeck rule raises the inference that the beneficiary's
expectancy still materializes day by day, even though its source
has been wrongfully cut off. It implies that the jury may take a
second look at the extent of a beneficiary's expectancy should
some event subsequent to the decedent's death but prior to judgment prevent or influence materialization. For although the
right of action arises upon the decedent's death, that does not
mean that the beneficiary sustains all his injuries at that time.
The beneficiary is compensated as if this were the case for the
simple reason that in personal injury suits it is usually impractical to hold the case open until all of the beneficiary's injuries
are ascertained. The beneficiary's injuries are a day by day
affair, while a court's disposition of a case is not. This is the
reason a jury must, of necessity, make predictions as to future
damages.
Yet, it would be ludicrous to put blinders on the jury by
compelling them to predict the prospective pecuniary injuries of
a beneficiary who no longer exists, simply because damages are
traditionally assessed as of the time the right of action arose.
There is no doubt that the beneficiary's death is an event relevant
to the assessment of damages. The real problem with remarriage or adoption, on the other hand, is relevancy. At this point
we encounter the most formidable obstacle to the introduction
of remarriage or adoption: the collateral source rule.
The collateral source rule has been hotly debated in discussions on the law of damages,"" 7 but attacks upon it have failed to
dislodge its firm hold. It has become entrenched in the law of
most American jurisdictions. The rule states that compensation
105 See note 91 supra.
106 The policy rationale behind the McDaniel decision is that "the doc-

trine of abatement would place a premium on delaying tactics on the part
of defendants in these cases, who would be relieved of all liability if the
case should be prolonged long enough." 34 Ill. 2d 487, 492, 216 N.E.2d
140, 143 (1966).
107 See Note, Unreason in the Law of Damages: The Collateral Source
Rule, 77 HARv. L. REV. 741 (1964).
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from a third party - a "collateral source" - does not mitigate
the damages recoverable by the injured party.0 8 Thus, for example, the defendant in a personal injury suit cannot introduce
the fact that the plaintiff, who is asking for damages for time
lost from his work, was gratuitously paid for that time by his
employer. 10 9 Likewise, a defendant in a dramshop action cannot
complain that the decedent carried a life insurance policy, the
proceeds of which were payable to his widow.'"
The rule has been upheld for punitive reasons,'
but its
main thrust goes to the uniqueness of the duty of compensation
in personal injury actions. Courts emphatically insist that a
plaintiff's loss that is not compensated by or through the defendant remains uncompensated no matter how much the plaintiff
receives from ancillary sources. The compensation is unique in
that it simply must come from the defendant, or one stepping
into his shoes. Hence, in Shea v. Rettie,11 the Massachusetts
Supreme Court stated:
There is no joint relationship between the city whose obligation
to the plaintiff arises under a contract of employment . . . and the
defendant whose obligation originates in his wrongful conduct.
The duty imposed by law upon him is to compensate the plaintiffs
for all the damage done by his negligence including impairment of
earning capacity. That obligation is not fulfilled because it happens
that the plaintiffs have a contract with the city which entitles them
to be indemnified by disability payments during absence from duty.
Compensation for the defendant's wrong is not thereby furnished
by the defendant. Such payments 3by the city do not concern and
should not benefit the defendant."
Insofar as the rule touches wrongful death actions, it has
been utilized in both its punitive and unique aspects. 1 4 For
those states with non-punitive wrongful death statutes, the
unique aspect of the rule was well explained by the New York
district court in The City of Rome:115
It may often happen that, by reason of inheritance, or insurance,
or by reason of her own industry and superior capacity, a widow
may be much better off pecuniarily after her husband's death than
she ever had been in his lifetime. No one has ever suggested that
such considerations must be taken into account in computing her
pecuniary loss. Her remarriage is analogous. The fundamental
question is, not her financial situation after her husband's death,
§ 90 (1935).
Cooney v. Hughes, 310 Ill. App. 371, 378, 34 N.E.2d 566, 570 (1941).
110 Deel v. Heiligenstein, 244 Ill. 239, 241-42, 91 N.E. 429, 430-31 (1910).
"I1"If there must be a windfall certainly it is more just that the injured
person shall profit therefrom, rather than the wrongdoer shall be relieved of
his full responsibility for his wrongdoing." Grayson v. Williams, 256 F.2d
61, 65 (10th Cir. 1958).
112 287 Mass. 454, 192 N.E. 44, annotated in 95 A.L.R. 571 (1934).
108

McCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES

109

13 Id. at 457, 192 N.E. at 46, annotated in 95 A.L.R. at 574.
See note 100 supra.

114

115

48 F.2d 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1930).
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but what she might reasonably have expected to receive from him
had he lived.116
This rule is not the only obstacle to a theory based on mitigation. The courts' third rationale, which is based upon policy
considerations, also imposes a restriction. This theory states
that disclosure of remarriage would lead to a speculative comparison of the economic abilities of the new spouse with those
of the decedent.", Standing alone, this theory does not seem
convincing. Predicting the value of a person who is still living
is no more speculative than predicting the value of one who is
dead. The only difference is that in the former case a jury's
prediction can later be proven wrong, whereas dead men tell
no tales. But the point is that the jury is already inundated
with speculative matter concerning its predictions of the value
of the first husband's life and the beneficiary's interest in it.
Courts seem to think that the jury is confused enough with
these two variables, and that consideration of the additional
factor would lead to an intolerable situation. Hence:
The highly speculative inquiry into the prospective value of the
second marriage would not contribute to the certainty of the
ultimate determination of the damages, and could only serve to
inject considerations which would serve to confuse the issues.",8
If a defendant attempts to introduce evidence of a beneficiary's remarriage, so long as he proceeds on a theory of mitigation of damages, he will be defeated by the collateral source
rule and policy considerations. Only by arguing that the beneficiary's expectancy no longer materializes after remarriage can
a defendant evade the grasp of these two rules. His position
must be that damages, or a specific portion of them, simply do
not accrue after such a change of status. This is an easy proposition to sustain when the beneficiary dies; it is more difficult
when the beneficiary remarries. The reason for the difficulty is
this: While death ends the beneficiary's ability to receive benefits, remarriage does not. Remarriage simply thrusts the beneficiary back into a relation of the same general kind as was
terminated by the defendant's wrongful act. The relations are
not identical; even from a pecuniary standpoint each marriage
is unique. There is, therefore, a good chance that if all damages
116 Id.
117

In

at 338.
Smith v. Wells, 258 S.C. 316, 320, 188 S.E.2d 470, 471, the court

said:
While testimony of the remarriage of the widow is rejected by the
decisions upon several grounds, we think the soundest reason rests upon
policy. These authorities point out that such testimony would involve

an inquiry into the relative merits of the two husbands, which could
only be determined by a comparison of their prospective earnings, contributions, services, society, and companionship.
118 Id. at 321, 188 S.E.2d at 472.
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are cut off after remarriage, the beneficiary will have been undercompensated for her pecuniary loss.
Yet perhaps it is possible to find an element, constant from
marriage to remarriage, on which part of the pecuniary loss is
based. For many years the law has been that a beneficiary's
recovery is not limited to merely the amount representing the
right to support, but includes the amount of benefits reasonably
expected over and above that right." 9 It cannot be denied, however, that the latter amount includes the former amount, and
that the loss of support is an ingredient of the recoverable damages. 20 Assume that a beneficiary has been receiving benefits
because of her status within a relation, whether marriage or
lineal kinship. Some of these benefits accrue as a result of her
legal right to support, 12 1 according to the husband's 12 - or father's 12 3 - power and duty to supply them. But other benefits
are mere expectations. These accrue according to the decedent's
inclination to supply them.
Now assume that the relation is one of marriage. A wife's
right to support is a right common to marriages generally ;124
hence, insofar as that right is concerned, her particular marriage is not unique. What is not common to marriages generally is the expectancy of other benefits, such as gifts, personal
services, love and affection, companionship, etc. In this regard
each marriage is unique. When the marriage is terminated by
divorce, the expectancy dies with it, but the right to support
remains 1 5 through the statutory authority of courts to award
alimony. 2 6 Both death127 and remarriage" 8 terminate these
alimony payments and end the right. Divorce law recognizes
no difference in the effects of the two changes of status upon
the right, nor does it take into account the financial abilities of
the second husband.
When a marriage is terminated by wrongful death, both the
beneficiary's general expectancy and the included right die with
it; but the monetary manifestations are revived and compen119 Railroad Company v. Barron, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 90, 106 (1866)
(construing the Illinois Wrongful Death Act).
12 See Wood v. Philadelphia, 13.&W. R.R., 24 Del. 336, 76 A. 613
(1910).
121 Lyons v. Schanbacher, 316 Ill. 569, 573, 147 N.E. 440, 442 (1925),
overruled on other grounds in Laleman v. Crombez, 6 Ill. 2d 194, 199-200,
127 N.E.2d 489, 491 (1955).
122 Richheimer v. Richheimer, 59 Ill. App. 2d 354, 359, 208 N.E.2d 346,
349 (1965).
12 Dwyer v. Dwyer, 366 Ill. 630, 634, 10 N.E.2d 344, 346 (1937).
"2 See Arndt v. Arndt, 399 Ill. 490, 495, 78 N.E.2d 272, 275 (1948)
(right of support is a common law right).
25 Herrick v. Herrick, 319 Ill. 146, 150, 149 N.E. 820, 823 (1925).
126 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 19 (1973).
"17 Kramp v. Kramp, 2 Ill. App. 2d 17, 21, 117 N.E.2d 859, 861 (1954).
128 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 19 (1973).
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sated through the Wrongful Death Act. The fact that these
manifestations arise from two different sources - one a unique
expectancy and the other a common right - has apparently not
been advanced before the courts. Now if the right is common,
when the beneficiary remarries she steps into the same right she
originally had. The only difference is in its value, which varies
according to the second husband's power to give. The question
is, must the second husband's power be compared with the first,
merely because the right to support varies in value? If so, the
courts will exclude the fact of remarriage from evidence under
the collateral source rule and policy considerations. Or should
a court take a second look when a widow reassumes the status
of wife before trial, and cut off those damages reflecting the
right of support from the decedent at the point of the beneficiary's remarriage? The McDaniel case indicates that such an
action would be procedurally sound; the Mulvey decision indicates that the knowledge of remarriage is already before the
jury; and divorce law provides an analogous result. In essence,
these two cases and divorce law provide the three legs upon
which an approach is based aimed at disclosing remarriage
without involving a consideration of the second spouse's contributions.
This approach would have two definite advantages. First,
it would sidestep the operation of both the collateral source rule
and the courts' policy considerations. These objections to the
disclosure of remarriage center on the notion that the second
spouse is providing compensation for the beneficiary's injury.
If the disclosure does not invoke a discussion of benefits coming
from the second spouse, these objections are irrelevant. Second, this approach would resolve the conflict among courts over
the effect upon a jury of the disclosure during voir dire examination. The courts would be given an opportunity to provide
specific standards for how a jury should consider such disclosure.
The approach would have one drawback: the reacquired
right may not be worth as much in the second marriage as in
the first, and this approach must not attempt to measure the
difference in value. Therefore, situations could still arise in
which not all of the beneficiary's pecuniary injuries were compensated in a death action. But the Illinois Wrongful Death
Act merely says that the jury should award "fair and just compensation with reference to the pecuniary injuries ....,1129 The
statute seems flexible enough to accommodate this approach. It
must be remembered that because of the predictive function of
129

ILL. REV. STAT.

ch. 70, § 2 (1973).
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the jury, each award will either overcompensate or undercompensate a beneficiary. It must also be remembered that remarriage would only exclude benefits accruing as a result of the
basic, bottom-line right of support, which will amount to considerably less than all the benefits that one spouse could reasonably expect from the other.
In any event, a solution such as this seems preferable to
allowing disclosure of remarriage on voir dire examination, on
the dubious premise that the jury will obey the judge's instructions not to consider the change in status during the case in
chief. This approach could give the jury some criteria for considering the effect of such disclosure, rather than leaving the
matter to the imaginations of the jurors and the defense attorney. In addition to predicting the value of the beneficiary's
general expectancy, the jury would predict what part of that
value was based upon her right to support. In his instructions
the judge could define this right in terms of what the wife
could have demanded from the deceased in a court of law had
the parties obtained a separation. The value of this amount
(computed from the time of remarriage) could then be subtracted from the value of the beneficiary's general expectancy
(computed from the time of the decedent's death). This formula would also limit the effect of the presumption of loss in
favor of widows and lineal next of kin, which at present is not
10
well-considered. 3
CONCLUSION

It appears that the problem of disclosure of remarriage and
adoption is not settled in Illinois. The court never quite came
to grips with the ramifications of the Van Beeck rule, and the
Watson case illustrated the lengths to which a defense counsel
will go to get mileage out of the disclosure of remarriage on
voir dire. There is a basic conflict between the Illinois Supreme
Court's position regarding voir dire and its refusal to allow
disclosure of remarriage in the case in chief. One or the other
of these positions, preferably its position on the disclosure of
remarriage, should be reversed.
Perhaps in the near future some insurance company will
prosecute still another appeal and secure a resolution of the
conflict. Until then, the remarriage problem will continue to
provide a test for the ingenuity - and honesty - of defense
counsel.
Thomas E. Cowgill
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See note 83 supra.

